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Aesthetics As A Basis For Regulation
DANIEL RIESEL*
The beginning of my talk is to remind you that the rules of
law taught in law school die a very hard death. One rule that
deserves to die, but is not yet relegated to historical footnotes, is
the rule that limitations on the use of property may not be
based solely on aesthetic considerations. This rule is modified by
the recognition that if other legitimate interests are present, reg-
ulations which have aesthetic considerations as subsidiary or in-
cidental purposes are valid. That is the rule as articulated by
Rathkopf' and many commentators. Courts still hold that you
cannot legislate purely for aesthetic purposes. In my view, no
matter what position this principle has had in the past, the body
of environmental law that has recently emerged has eliminated
any rational basis for the continued life of this principle. There
is no longer any reason for the treatment of aesthetics as some-
thing alien to our system of land use regulation, and no need to
mask aesthetic concerns as public health, safety or welfare, in
order to articulate a valid basis for regulation.
Let me pause a few minutes and go over the traditional rule.
When you hear the quotes of the experts I think you will all
smile, but you will still see some of these principles, which we
might not regard as permanant, emerging in the cases in the not
so distant past. In one of the cases, Kern Bill Posting and Dis-
tributing Company v. The City of Denver, the court went out of
its way to explain that,
the cut of dress, the color of garment worn, the styles of hat, the
architecture of the building, or its color may be distasteful to the
refined senses of some, but government can neither control nor
regulate in such affairs. The doctrines of the commune invest
such authority in the state, but ours is a constitutional govern-
ment based upon the individuality and intelligence of the citizens.
And does not seek, nor has it the power to control him except in
those matters where the rights of others are impaired.
So into the sixties, there were cases in which courts, in uphold-
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ing ordinances, went out of their way to find that the justifica-
tion for the regulation in question is something other than aes-
thetics. There has been, however, a change, and I think that
change has been a direct product of our growth and affluence
and a manifestation of that affluence in suburbia.
In this connection, recall the Stover case in New York.2 The
Stovers were fairly unhappy residents of the city of Rye. To pro-
test their disdain for the city, they displayed, in their front yard
a clothesline hung with old uniforms, underwear, rags and scare-
crows. Each year it was put up; after six years and six clothes-
lines, the city enacted an ordinance prohibiting the display of
clotheslines in front or side yards abutting the street. The Sto-
vers were convicted of violating that ordinance. The Court of
Appeals held that reasonable legislation designed to promote
aesthetic interests is valid and permissible under the exercise of
the police power. 8 Once it is conceded that aesthetics is a valid
subject of legislative concern, the conclusion of that court seems
inescapable. If zoning restrictions aimed at insuring neighbor-
hood amenities are to be stricken as invalid, it should be, as one
commentator has said, not because they seek to promote aes-
thetic objectives, but solely because the restrictions constitute
unreasonable devices. 4 The Stover case, coupled with the semi-
nal federal case Berman v. Parker,5 was, some thought, the fur-
thest permissible reach of restrictions on aesthetics or of aes-
thetic zoning.
But after that, a series of cases were argued and decided in
most jurisdictions that enacted zoning for aesthetic purposes.
The rationale in the decisions which support such zoning is usu-
ally coupled with public health and safety justifications, but still
there is a recognition of. aesthetics as a legitimate basis for zon-
ing regulation. New York, however, which has long been re-
garded as the jurisdiction which has led the way in permitting
zoning for aesthetic purposes, has attempted to straddle both
sides of the fence. The decisions subsequent to Stover are not
dramatically different: while the judges writing these decisions
specifically cite Stover and follow its determination that aes-
thetic purposes will support a restriction on land use, they also
examine the impact of the ordinance in relation to the end that
it is intended to serve.6 "An ordinance which imposes a negligi-
ble or modest restraint is likely to be upheld although its pur-
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pose is solely an aesthetic one. On the other hand, an ordinance
which imposes severe hardship or unreasonable restraint may be
subject to a balancing process and held invalid."'7 Now perhaps
this accurately restates the principles that are set forth by Pro-
fessor Anderson, but we still see, and this is the point, an unwill-
ingness to allow aesthetics alone to serve as a basis for regula-
tion of land. This is true not only in the more restrictive
jurisdictions, but also in New York.
We turn now to the second theme of this presentation, and
leave the defense of environmental law to another forum. The
environmental movement, born in the 1960s, grew out of a con-
cern for aesthetics and a demand for the preservation of natural
beauty. When we think of emerging environmental law, three
controversies come immediately to mind: the Storm King con-
troversy, the fight over the Grand Canyon dams, and the dispute
concerning the indiscriminate and widespread use of DDT.
One of these controversies, the Storm King Mountain con-
troversy,* gives rise to what I would call a lot of hard law. A
decade of judicial activism in policing administrative agencies
with respect to environmental decision-making and in expanding
concepts of standing has followed.' Statutory law favoring citi-
zens groups has resulted. 10 But the heart of the scenic Hudson
cases is a statement of the validity and the necessity of aesthet-
ics as a legitimate basis of natural resource allocation and, there-
fore, of land use planning. The Second Circuit held, in remand-
ing the matter to the Power Commission, that the Commission
should re-examine all questions where the court found the re-
cord insufficient and all related matters."" The court ordered
that the Commission's renewed proceeding must include, as a
basic concern, the preservation of natural beauty and natural
historical shrines, and must keep in mind that, in our affluent
society, the cost of a project is only one of several factors to be
considered.12 That decision goes on, in less dramatic terms, to
specify the need to evaluate aesthetic, conservational and recrea-
tional factors in determining the allocation of other natural re-
sources in a basic comprehensive plan, and indicates that aes-
thetic values should be included in this comprehensive plan for
the allocation of federal resources.18 The phrase, "best adapted
to a comprehensive plan,""' is hardly distinguishable from the
almost universal requirements that municipal zoning be in ac-
1981]
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cordance with a comprehensive plan.
After the decision in Scenic Hudson, there was a literal out-
burst of federal and local activity dealing with considerations of
natural beauty. A little known legislative act here in the State of
New York was the establishment, in 1966, of the Commission on
Natural Beauty.'5 That was a rather short-lived political ploy,
but one which was in response to the controversies developing
after the Storm King case and in response to the recognition
that aesthetics and natural beauty can be regulated and should
be considered in the regulation of land use.
Another case decided in this period is Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe.' This case, decided by the Supreme
Court in 1971, interpreted a section of the national highway leg-
islation. This case was remanded to the district court with direc-
tions to consider all factors in the allocation of highway corri-
dors and the preservation of park land.17 It seems to me that the
remand occurred because the federal agency did not give any
reasonable interpretation to the legislation it mandated. This
case is another recognition that planners and bureaucrats must
take aesthetic or natural beauty into consideration.
Between the enactment in 1966 of the particular statute liti-
gated in Overton Park,'8 and the actual decision in Overton
Park in 1971, there was a virtual flood of legislation in the envi-
ronmental area. At the end of 1969, Congress enacted the first
and most important of the environmental statutes, the National
Environmental Policy Act.' That act made aesthetic objectives
a fundamental part of our national policy.2 0 In NEPA, Congress
recognized the profound interrelationship between man's activi-
ties and the environment and declared the creation and
maintainence of a productive harmony between man and the en-
vironment to be a national goal, "to the end, that the nation
may assure for all Americans, safe, healthy, productive" and,
"aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings."'I It is in-
teresting that land use regulations designed to promote aestheti-
cally pleasing surroundings are precisely the regulations aimed
at by the traditional rule against zoning for aesthetic reasons.
The very word "pleasing" conjures up that which the traditional
rule held to be an unconstitutional object of government regula-
tion. I think the most surprising thing about the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, or NEPA as it is known in the trade, is
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that courts decided that they would enforce the doctrine set out
there and put some teeth in it.
Enforcement of NEPA resulted in a tremendous body of
case law, much of it dealing with environmental impacts which
are aesthetic. It also gave rise to the enactment of little NEPA
laws by the states.2 In these state statutes, specific terms direct
that state and local administrators take aesthetic values into
consideration. The California legislation, for example, contains
directions to take actions to insure the environment remains
"pleasing to the senses and intellect of man." 0 Further, it is a
stated policy of California to insure that the citizens are pro-
vided with full "enjoyment of aesthetic, natural, scenic and his-
toric environmental qualities. . . .." The New York law is
based on a legislative finding that the maintenance of a quality
environment, for the people of the state, now and at all times, is
healthful and pleasing to the senses and intellect, and the envi-
ronment is defined to include preservation of objects of historic
or aesthetic significance. 8
The question may be, of course, how a mere movement of
law, found heretofore only in statutes, can result in the death of
a rule that has its foundation in constitutional law. I don't know
if I can supply that answer, but courts have stated that the
world is changing and that law must respond to demands of
modern society.2 Even though the meaning of constitutional
guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must ex-
pand and contract to meet new and different conditions. That
deemed to be unreasonable in the past may now be reasonable
because of changing community values. Among these changes is
the growing notion that towns and cities can and should be aes-
thetically pleasing and that a visually satisfying environment
tends to contribute to the well-being of its inhabitants. The con-
clusion which flows from this analysis, in my view, needs little
documentation: once and for all, the old legal rule should be put
to rest.
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20. This is unquestionably the rule in almost all other states, although it is not the
rule prevailing in Illinois (it is the minority rule there). It was also briefly abandoned in
New York during the Keating period. In the late sixties, Judge Keating led the Court of
Appeals in a strong swing back toward a pro-developer position. The New York Court of
Appeals has gradually recovered from that temporary right-wing deviation; the Keating
law on land use is clearly no longer followed in New York, although it continues to gener-
ate a lot of confusion.
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